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1Summary
By studying the case of Bombay, the biggest urban agglomeration in India, we show that
providing adequate ‘pollution-reducing’ infrastructure, e.g. the sewage system or waste
collection and disposal, can be a very eﬀective instrument of urban environmental pol-
icy. The questions are, how can pollution-reducing infrastructure be supplied eﬃciently
and how has it to be combined with economic instruments of environmental policy (like
Pigouvian taxes) in order to reach an eﬃcient outcome?
Our theoretical analysis is based on a general spatial equilibrium model of a mono-
centric city and its hinterland. The model comprises two private goods (consumption of
goods and living space), two public goods (infrastructure and environmental quality), and
a continuum of households, who choose their place of residence. Environmental pollution
is a by-product of the households’ consumption of goods. Infrastructure reduces the pol-
luting emissions per unit of consumption: a part of the pollution is disposed of ‘properly’
and causes no environmental damage. Infrastructure is a public good, since it serves to
reduce the polluting emissions of all households residing in the close neighbourhood. The
analysis has two parts.
First, the Pareto optimal allocation is determined. We show that the eﬃcient alloca-
tion of pollution-reducing infrastructure geographically diﬀerentiated, i.e. infrastructure
density declines from the centre to the periphery. An adequate provision of pollution-
reducing infrastructure is particularly important in the rapidly growing cities of develop-
ing countries. We show population growth necessitates improved infrastructure provision
throughout the city, not just in newly inhabited areas.
Second, we consider two settings how the Pareto optimal allocation can be imple-
mented in a decentralised economy: in the ﬁrst setting the urban government provides
infrastructure and imposes a Pigouvian tax on consumption. This setting is relevant, if
the government can estimate the polluting emissions, but the households cannot. In the
second setting pollution-reducing infrastructure is provided privately and subsidised by
the urban government, which also imposes a Pigouvian tax on emissions. This setting is
applicable, if private households can monitor their polluting emissions.
In the case of public infrastructural provision, the Pigouvian tax on consumption is
shown to depend on the location, where the respective unit is consumed. As a result,
2the tax burden diﬀers among the locations and income transfers are necessary in order
to implement the optimum as a residential equilibrium. In the case of private supply
of infrastructure, private households undersupply this public good, unless a subsidy on
infrastructure is paid. This subsidy is shown to be geographically diﬀerentiated, and a
redistribution of incomes is necessary to implement the optimum as a residential equilib-
rium, too.
Hence, even if pollution is homogenous, geographically diﬀerentiated (i) infrastructural
provision, (ii) ﬁscal instruments of environmental policy and (iii) transfer payments are
needed to implement the Pareto optimum as a residential market equilibrium. These
sophisticated policies result from considering pollution-reducing infrastructure as an in-
strument of urban environmental policy and jointly determining infrastructure supply and
ﬁscal policy instruments. Given the high relevance of pollution-reducing infrastructure
for urban environmental quality, this approach may lead to considerable welfare gains.
31 Introduction
Infrastructure, which generally comprises the stock of physical and social capital owned
by the public sector, includes (i) utilities, i.e. water supply, sewage system, electricity,
waste collection and disposal etc, (ii) communication infrastructure, (iii) transport infra-
structure, i.e. roads, railways, etc, and (iv) land development measures, i.e. drainage
improvement, ﬂood control, reforestation projects, etc (Conrad 1994, 2001).1 In an ur-
ban context, a major part of infrastructure has an immediate impact on environmental
quality, since it helps either to mitigate pollution or to dispose of waste so that it does less
damage to urban environmental quality (Section 2). We call this part “pollution-reducing
infrastructure”.
In this paper we argue that it is necessary to consider an adequate provision of
pollution-reducing infrastructure as a tool of urban environmental policy. We show
that the eﬃcient supply of pollution-reducing infrastructure and environmental policy
by means of Pigouvian taxes are mutually dependent. Hence, if either infrastructure is
taken for granted when determining the Pigouvian tax rates, or if ﬁscal instruments of
environmental policy are treated as ﬁxed when determining the supply of infrastructure,
an eﬃcient outcome is missed. In particular, if pollution-reducing infrastructure is sup-
plied publicly, the optimal Pigouvian tax rates are geographically diﬀerentiated, even if
pollution is spatially homogenous.
An adequate provision of pollution-reducing infrastructure is particularly important
in the rapidly growing cities of developing countries. Here, we analyze how the eﬃcient
supply of infrastructure has to be adapted to a growing urban population.
The close relation between infrastructure and urban environmental quality has been
widely overlooked in both the literature of environmental economics and the economic lit-
erature dealing with infrastructure. The comparatively meagre (cf. Verhoef and Nijkamp
2002:159) literature analyzing environmental problems from the perspective of urban
economics mainly focuses either on the geographical distribution of polluting ﬁrms and
households, and considers the trade-oﬀ between commuting costs and high damage from
pollution in the neighbourhood of the ﬁrms (e.g. Henderson 1977; Lucas 2001; Dijkstra
and Lange 2003), or analyzes the trade-oﬀ between positive Marshallian externalities
1In the paper, we focus on physical infrastructure.
4promoting growth and the opposing negative externalities of environmental pollution
(Verhoef and Nijkamp 2002). None of these papers, however, refers to the role of urban
infrastructure.
There are some contributions in urban economics which deal with the spatial distri-
bution of public services within cities (for an overview see Revelle 1998) or the eﬃcient
private ﬁnancing of public infrastructure (e.g. Brueckner 1997; Knaap et al. 2001).2 The
major part of research in related ﬁelds, however, considers infrastructure as an exoge-
nously given quantity (Haughwout 2002:406).
Since we are interested in the spatial distribution of pollution-reducing infrastructure,
the paper also aims at contributing to the literature on spatial environmental economics.
Kolstad (1987) has shown that the spatial diﬀerentiation of environmental policies leads
to higher welfare than homogenous policies, if marginal costs and marginal damage of
pollution diﬀer between the locations of polluting ﬁrms.3 In contrast to Kolstad’s setting,
we consider homogenous pollution and identical preferences of all households. We show
that the optimal environmental policy is nevertheless spatially diﬀerentiated, which is
the endogenous outcome of jointly determining the public supply of pollution-reducing
infrastructure and the Pigouvian tax on polluting consumption.
The paper is organised as follows: The following Section 2 demonstrates the importance
of infrastructure for urban environmental quality by referring to the case of the Indian
megacity Bombay. Section 3 presents the model of general spatial equilibrium. The
optimal allocation is analyzed in the ﬁrst part of the analysis in Section 4.4 Here, we are
mainly interested in the optimum geographical distribution of infrastructure and in the
optimal changes to infrastructure in a city with a growing population.
The second part of the analysis (Section 5) is concerned with the mutual interdepen-
dence between a ’classical’ environmental economic instrument, i.e. a Pigouvian tax on
pollution, and an optimum provision of pollution-reducing infrastructure. Two diﬀerent
2Explicit reference to the environmental impacts of infrastructure is only made in the case of trans-
portation infrastructure (e.g. Lundqvist et al. 1998). The questions posed in that context (e.g. concerning
the eﬃcient modal split between public and private transportation) are quite diﬀerent from ours.
3More precisely, the public beneﬁt achieved from spatially diﬀerentiated taxation is particularly high,
if marginal cost and marginal damage functions are steep.
4The relevant literature on the economics of welfare in cities is reviewed brieﬂy in Section 4.
5settings are considered: (i) public and (ii) private supply of pollution-reducing infra-
structure. Both settings may be adequate to a given problem. (i) A public infrastructual
provision (Section 5.2) is required, if households cannot observe their polluting emissions
and only the government is able to do so.5 If, on the other hand, households can monitor
their actual emissions, it may be better, if private households provide infrastructure.6
This setting is analyzed in Section 5.3. Section 6 concludes.
2 Case study: pollution-reducing infrastructure in
Bombay
In this section we argue that urban infrastructure contributes to a cleaner urban envi-
ronment in many respects. We therefore consider the case of Bombay, the largest urban
agglomeration in India.7 In 2001, Bombay oﬃcially had a population of 16 million people
(Government of India 2001), and population continues to grow rapidly. Bombay’s popu-
lation suﬀers from a variety of environmental problems, many of which could be reduced
by the provision of an adequate infrastructure (Quaas 2004:198):
An inadequate sewage system exposes the population to sewage water contaminated
with bacteria and to the pollution of rivers and coastal waters. In Bombay, more than
40% of total population has to rely on public sanitation services, which are often of poor
quality (Palnitkar 1998, Government of India 2001).
A better drainage and ﬂood control could also contribute to urban environmental
quality. Some areas of Bombay, which are built below sea level, ﬂood repeatedly. This
causes severe health problems to the aﬀected population due to the heavily polluted
coastal waters (Quaas 2004:189).
As a consequence of insuﬃcient waste collection, much refuse remains at the road-
side (Prabhavalkar 2002). This has an immediate impact on the population living there.
5For example, individual households may have diﬃculties to observe their contribution to urban water
pollution, but possibly an urban authority may be able to assess this.
6This seems quite reasonable in the case of solid waste.
7In 1994, Bombay has been renamed Mumbai. However, internationally the name Bombay is still
common and therefore used here, too.
6Waste is frequently burned without any form of protection, which further increases air
pollution (Shah and Nagpal 1997, Tondwalkar and Phatak 1997). Similar problems are
caused by inadequate disposal sites (Sharma et al. 1997, Tondwalkar and Phatak 1997).
Bad roads contribute to noise pollution, but they also aﬀect air pollution: in Bombay,
about a third of the SPM (suspended particulate matter) load of the air, which is one
of the most serious health threats, comes from roads dust (Shah and Nagpal 1997, table
2.7).
To summarise, in many cases the adequate provision of infrastructure can be a very
eﬀective instrument in urban environmental policy. The question is, how can pollution-
reducing infrastructure be supplied eﬃciently and how has it to be combined with other
economic instruments of environmental policy (such as Pigouvian taxes) in order to reach
an eﬃcient outcome?
3 The model
The analysis is based on a general spatial equilibrium model of a monocentric city and
its hinterland. The model comprises four goods, an aggregate consumption commodity,
living space, infrastructure, and environmental quality (which is a public good); and a
continuum of identical individuals. It is of the von Th¨ unen-type (see, e.g., Fujita and
Thisse 2002, chapter 3), i.e. commuting costs are an important determinant of the city’s
spatial structure (Anas et al. 1998, Nijkamp 1999:533).
Space has one dimension in the model, represented by z ∈ IR, and is symmetric to
z = 0.8 The border of the city Z between the city and the hinterland is endogenously
determined. Production in the city does not need space and is located in the Central
Industrial District (CID) at z = 0. By symmetry, it is suﬃcient to consider the half
space z ≥ 0.
Commuting from the place of residence at z ∈ [0,Z] to the CID takes tc = tc(z) units
of time, where tc(z) increases monotonically in the distance commuted, i.e. t0
c(z) > 0;
and an individual living in the immediate neighbourhood of the CID has no commuting
costs. i.e. tc(0) = 0. No further commuting costs arise.
8It is straightforward to extend the model to form a symmetric two-dimensional plane and describe
space in polar coordinates.
7There are N > 0 identical individuals living in the city. They have identical preferences
on private consumption of goods (amount x), living space (size s), and environmental
pollution E. The preferences are represented by the utility function
u(x,s,E) = x
α · s
1−α − d(E), (1)
where α ∈ (0,1), i.e. u(x,s,E) is increasing and concave in the consumption of goods x
and of living space s. Environmental damage d(E) is increasing and convex in the envi-
ronmental pollution E.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time, i.e. the gross time being in the city





where N is the number of individuals living in the city and n(z) is the population density
at place z ∈ [0,Z], i.e. n(z) people live in the area [z,z + dz].
All urban residents are employed in the CID at a competitive wage rate w. Given the
commuting time tc(z) of a worker living at z, her opportunity costs w·tc(z) of commuting
are given by the commuting time tc(z) valued at wage rate w.
The consumption good is produced by means of labour l alone. The technology is
described by the production function F(·), which is assumed to be increasing and concave.
The hinterland of the city is big, such that the city may be considered as a small open
economy which trades the consumption good at a competitive price p.
Environmental pollution is caused by the consumption of goods, i.e. the polluting
emissions e(z) of a household residing at location z are generated as a by-product of
consumption.10 To keep notation simple, we have normalised pollution measurement
units so that emissions e(z) equal per capita consumption x(z). Environmental pollution
9Leisure is ignored for reasons of simplicity.
10One may think of solid waste, wastewater, or air pollutants, e.g., from cooking or heating.




n(z) · e(z)dz for 0 ≤ z ≤ Z. (3)
Pollution-reducing infrastructure is considered as a public means of abating pollution
in the following sense. Emissions e(z) generated by a household residing at location z are
assumed to decrease with the density of infrastructure i(z) provided there,
e(z) = γ(i(z)) · x(z), (4)
where γ(i) has the properties













The interpretation of modelling infrastructure in this way is as follows: the polluting by-
products of each unit of consumption are the same with and without infrastructure. If
infrastructure exists with density i(z) > 0 at place z, however, only a fraction γ(i(z)) < 1
of these by-products is actually emitted into the environment, the remainder 1 − γ(i(z))
is disposed of ‘properly’ by means of the infrastructure and causes no environmental
damage.
Infrastructure i(z)dz available in the space interval [z,z+dz] is assumed to be a local
public good, that is, it serves to reduce the polluting emissions of all n(z) households
residing in [z,z + dz], so that total emissions there are n(z)e(z) = γ(i(z))x(z).
The curvature properties of γ(·) imply that an increased provision of infrastructure
lowers the emissions generated by one unit of consumption, but the marginal gain of
additional infrastructure decreases with the amount of infrastructure already available.12
Building infrastructure comes at two kinds of costs: ﬁrst, the physical infrastructure
has to be bought at a ‘world market’ price pi, and second, installing and maintaining one
unit of infrastructure requires one unit of labour input.
11Since E is a pure public bad it is the same for all urban residents independent of the place of residence.
It is assumed that the adjacent neighbourhood is aﬀected by urban pollution to a considerable extent so
that there is no incentive for an urban dweller to move into the hinterland just to avoid the environmental
damage in the city.
12The last property in (5) requires that the curvature of γ(·) is not too small. For example, the
functions γ(i) = (1+i)− with  > 0 and the functions γ(i) = exp(−µi) with µ > 0 fulﬁl Condition (5).
The condition is needed to assure that there is an interior optimum and to derive Propositions 1 and 2.
9One point of diﬀerence should be noted here. In contrast to much of the literature on
infrastructure, it has no direct utility in our model. Rather, it generates a public good







n(z)γ(i(z))x(z)dz for 0 ≤ z ≤ Z, (6)
decreases with the density of infrastructure at any point in the city, i.e. dE/di(z) < 0 for
all z ∈ [0,Z].
All land within the city is owned by an urban government, which buys the land at a
given rural land rent r, and converts it into living space at zero costs in such a way that
one unit of land equals one unit of living space, i.e. the ‘height’ of the buildings is ﬁxed.
Except for exchanging land for consumption goods, nothing is transferred between the
city and its hinterland.
To complete the model, we assume that moving within the city is costless. Hence, a
residential equilibrium is characterised by the ‘spatial equilibrium condition’: the utility
of each individual is the same at all locations in the city. Otherwise, there would be an
incentive to move for at least one individual.
4 Optimal allocation
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature about employing welfare functions to
determine optimal allocations in an urban context. Using a utilitarian welfare function,
Mirrlees (1972) concluded that in the optimum, individuals diﬀering only with respect to
their place of residence will have the same marginal utility of consumption of goods and
living space, but will diﬀer in the level of utility. Only with a Rawlsian welfare function
will all otherwise identical individuals enjoy the same utility in the social optimum (Dixit
1973). Wildasin (1986) has shown that Mirrlees’ result of diﬀerent utilities of identical
individuals in the optimum under a utilitarian welfare function (’unequal treatment of
equals’) is due to diﬀerences in marginal utility of income between the individuals living
at diﬀerent places in a city.
Mirrlees’ result can also seen from a diﬀerent point of view: among all Pareto optimal
allocations, only one maximises the utilitarian welfare function. At the same time, there
10is only one Pareto optimal allocation, where all individuals enjoy equal utility, i.e. where
the spatial equilibrium condition holds. These two allocations are diﬀerent, as Mirrlees
has shown. The only welfare function, which selects the same allocation out of the Pareto
optima as the spatial equilibrium condition, is the Rawlsian welfare function (Dixit 1973).
Rather than to start with a welfare function, we adopt a diﬀerent approach and deter-
mine the Pareto optima. We then concentrate on the Pareto optimal spatial equilibrium,
i.e. the Pareto optimal allocation where all individuals enjoy the same utility.
The procedure is to maximise the utility of one individual given a minimum utility
level of all other individuals and subject to the constraints, which result from the model
speciﬁcation as described in Section 3.
To derive the conditions for the Pareto optima, we use the Lagrange formalism. With-
out loss of generality, we maximise the utility of an individual living at z = 0 given
that all other individuals enjoy at least a level U(z) of utility, which is allowed to diﬀer
between diﬀerent places of residence z ∈ [0,Z].13 Formally, this condition reads
u(x(z),s(z),E) = U(z) for all 0 ≤ z ≤ Z. (7)
This equation describes a continuum of constraints, since we require it to hold for each
z ∈ [0,Z]. Hence, there is a continuum of Lagrangian multipliers λ(z) associated with
(7).
We now turn to the economic constraints of the optimisation. Both the size s(z) of
living space and the population density n(z) at each place z ∈ [0,Z] are choice variables.




n(˜ z) · s(˜ z)d˜ z for all z ∈ [0,Z]. (8)
This condition holds with equality in the optimum, because there are no gaps between
buildings (otherwise commuting costs would be unnecessarily high).
The spatial distribution of population in the city determines total labour supply ˆ L,
which equals total endowment with time (Equation 2) less total time spent for commuting,
i.e.




13A spatial equilibrium, however, requires U(z) = U for all z ∈ [0,Z].
11Labor supply is divided into labour input L in the production sector in the CID and
the amount of labour required to install and maintain the infrastructure.14 Inserting



















The output F(L) of the production sector is used for aggregate consumption of goods




n(z)x(z)dz + ∆. (11)
The consumption of goods generates environmental pollution, as described by equation
(6). The Lagrangian multiplier for this constraint is η.
We ﬁnally require the value of net exports to equal the value of goods acquired from
the hinterland, i.e. the value of the land which is rented by the urban government and
the value of physical infrastructure bought from abroad (Lagrangian multiplier µ),







The Pareto optimal allocation consists of the consumption of goods x(z) and ﬂat size s(z)
of all individuals, the supply of infrastructure i(z) and population density n(z) at each
place in the city, as well as labour input L in production, pollution E, and net exports ∆.
It is found by solving the following problem:
max
{x(z),s(z),n(z),i(z)},∆,L,E
u(x(0),s(0),E) subject to (7),(10),(11),(6), and (12). (13)
14Remember that one unit of labour is required to install and maintain one unit of infrastructure.
Obviously it is best to employ people close to the infrastructure in question, because then no commuting
costs arise.


























































The Pareto optimal allocation is calculated by maximising the Lagrangian (14) with
respect to x(z), s(z), n(z), and i(z) for all 0 ≤ z ≤ Z, as well as L, E, and ∆. With little




1−α = π + γ(i(z))η (15)
λ(z)(1 − α)x(z)
α s(z)





c(˜ z)d˜ z (16)











0(i(z))n(z)x(z)η = µpi + ω (18)







µp = π (21)
15Here, we use the notation λ(0) := 1.
16The curvature properties of the utility function (1) and of the production function F(L) and As-
sumption 5 about the curvature of γ(i) assure that these conditions are also suﬃcient.
13Here, we have already cancelled the common factors n(z), and used constraint (7) to
derive Condition (17).17 Condition (17) may be simpliﬁed by inserting (15) and (16).




pF 0(L) [1 − tc(z)]
x(z)α s(z)1−α =
pF 0(L) [1 − tc(z)]
U(z) + d(E)
, (22)
which is the inverse marginal utility of wealth of the individual residing at z, if his income
is pF 0(L) [1 − tc(z)], i.e. the value of productive labour (see Equation (32) below). In
the remainder of the paper, we require that the optimum is a candidate for a spatial
equilibrium, i.e. we set U(z) = U for all z ∈ [0,Z]. In this case, λ(z)/µ diﬀers among
diﬀerent places in the city according to diﬀerences in commuting time at the diﬀerent
places of residence.18
For analyzing the properties of the Pareto optimal allocation, as determined by equa-
tions (15) – (21) and the constraints (7), (10), (11), (6), and (12) we introduce two
abbreviations. First, consider the damage from pollution. The Lagrangian multiplier η
may be interpreted as the social marginal damage from pollution measured in units of
utility, and the Lagrangian multiplier µ is the marginal utility of an increase in foreign
exchange. The social marginal damage from pollution D0 in units of foreign exchange is
given by the following equation:
D














N [U + d(E)]
N d
0(E). (23)
The factor N d0(E) is the aggregate marginal disutility of pollution; the factor
ˆ LpF 0(L)/[N [U + d(E)]] is an average individual’s inverse marginal utility of labour
income, as, on average, each urban resident spends ˆ L/N hours working. Hence, D0 is
17Observe that condition (17) requires tc(z) < 1. Hence, for the optimal distribution of the population
density it follows in particular that tc(Z) < 1, i.e. even residents at the border of the city have some
working time remaining after commuting to the CID.
18This reproduces Wildasin’s (1986) result about the ‘unequal treatment of equals’ mentioned above
in our more general setting.
14the aggregate marginal disutility from pollution expressed in terms of average marginal
utility of wage income.
The second abbreviation concerns the marginal costs of living space, which are given
as the right hand side of condition (16). This expression is in terms of utility. Dividing
it by µ yields the marginal costs of living space in units of foreign exchange, which we
abbreviate with r(z):






c(˜ z)d˜ z. (24)





p + γ(i(z))D0. (25)
This condition describes the optimal allocation of consumption of goods x(z) and living
space s(z).
Equation (18) determines the optimal allocation of pollution-reducing infrastructure.
Using Abbreviation (23) and Condition (19), this equation transforms to
−γ
0(i(z))n(z)x(z)D
0 = pi + pF
0(L). (26)
Diﬀerentiating Equation (26) with respect to z and using the conditions (25) and n(z) =
1/s(z), gives the following result:
Proposition 1 (Spatial distribution of infrastructure)













for 0 ≤ z ≤ Z.
Proof: See section A.1 in the appendix.
The main idea of this proposition is that the supply of infrastructure has to be spa-
tially diﬀerentiated in an adequate manner. More speciﬁcally, the optimal density of
infrastructure decreases from the CID to the periphery.19 The underlying reason for this
result is that in the neighbourhood of the CID, living space is scarcest: r(z) declines
19The exact relationship may change, if, e.g., congestion in commuting or diﬀerent income classes are
considered.
15monotonically from the CID to the periphery. As a consequence of Proposition 1, the
further outside an individual lives, the more he/she substitutes consumption of goods by
consumption of living space in the optimum:
Corollary 1
If the utility level is the same for all urban residents, U(z) = U, consumption of goods
decreases from the CID to the periphery, while consumption of living space increases.
Population density decreases from the CID to the periphery.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
One question of interest is, how optimal infrastructure supply changes, if the popu-
lation N of the city grows. It seems obvious that if the city expands, newly inhabited
areas should be supplied with infrastructure. But also in other areas infrastructure sup-
ply has to be adjusted to the change in population size. In particular, if some additional
assumptions are met, it can be shown that the optimal supply of infrastructure increases
everywhere in the city. The reason is that under these assumptions, while marginal costs
of infrastructure supply are constant, marginal utility of infrastructure increases, since
more people suﬀer from pollution. This argument holds for any place in the city, not just
for newly inhabited areas.
Proposition 2 (Adjustment of infrastructure to increasing population)
1. If the urban population increases, the optimal supply of infrastructure has to be
adjusted everywhere in the city, di(z)/dN 6= 0 for all z ∈ [0,Z].
2. Assume tc(z) = tc · z, F(L) = f · L, d(E) = δ · E, r = 0 and pi = 0. Then,
the optimal supply of infrastructure increases everywhere in the city, if the urban
population increases, di(z)/dN > 0 for all z ∈ [0,Z].
Proof: see Appendix A.3
5 Urban environmental policy in a decentralised econ-
omy
Now we turn to the problem of how to implement the socially optimal allocation in a
decentralised economy. We shall proceed in three steps: ﬁrst, we shall determine the
16laissez-faire allocation without government intervention (Section 5.1). Second, we shall
investigate the situation where the urban government supplies the pollution-reducing
infrastructure and imposes a Pigouvian tax on consumption (Section 5.2). Third, we shall
consider a setting, in which the government imposes a Pigouvian tax on emissions and
households provide the pollution-reducing infrastructure. The government will subsidise
infrastructure in order to achieve an optimal provision of infrastructure (Section 5.3).
Whether the setting investigated in Section 5.2 or in Section 5.3 is relevant to a spe-
ciﬁc context depends on whether the households can observe their consumption of goods
only or if they can monitor their polluting emissions: if households cannot monitor their
emissions, only the urban government can supply infrastructure eﬃciently. Since house-
holds cannot choose emissions independently of consumption, the Pigouvian tax is on
consumption rather than on emissions. If, on the other hand, households can monitor
their emissions, infrastructure can be provided by private households. In this case, the
Pigouvian tax is on emissions, because households can choose the emission level per unit
of consumption by choosing the infrastructure density i(z).
5.1 Laissez-faire
The laissez-faire equilibrium is the allocation in which households maximise utility –
given their income y(z) – by choosing the consumption of goods and living space as well
as their place of residence, and ﬁrms maximise proﬁts. In equilibrium all markets clear,
and the ‘spatial equilibrium condition’ holds, i.e. all individuals enjoy the same utility.
In the laissez-faire case, the urban government’s role is to rent out living space to urban
residents and to redistribute revenues (net of expenditures to rent undeveloped land)
equally among the inhabitants of the city. Let w be the wage rate and r(z) be the rent
on living space. Then, the income of a household living at place z ∈ [0,Z] is the sum of
wage earnings and the share of redistributed rents,





(r(z) − r)dz. (28)
Proﬁt maximisation of ﬁrms implies that the value of the marginal product of labour






1−α − d(E) s.t. y(z) = px(z) + r(z)s(z). (29)
The Lagrangian is Llf = x(z)α s(z)1−α − d(E) + λlf(z)[y(z) − px(z) − r(z)s(z)], and the


















which is the marginal utility of income y(z) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995:54f).
The resulting demand functions are x(z) = αy(z)/p for goods and s(z) = (1−α)y(z)/r(z)




α (1 − α)
1−α y(z)
pα r(z)1−α − d(E). (33)
The spatial equilibrium condition requires that the indirect utility is the same at all
locations z ∈ [0,Z], i.e. none of the identical households has an incentive to move. We
rewrite this condition in the following way:
v
















Here, we have inserted the demand for living space and used condition n(z) = 1/s(z).
Equation (34) determines the spatial diﬀerentiation of rent for living space in the laissez-





Exactly the same condition is derived by diﬀerentiating Equation (24), which gives the
marginal costs of living space in the Pareto optimum, with respect to space and inserting
the condition for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximum, w = pF 0(L). This observation reﬂects the
fact that the market for living space is undistorted.
185.2 Public supply of infrastructure
Turning to the investigation of urban environmental policy, we start with the case that
the urban government provides pollution reducing infrastructure. It is assumed to do
this optimally, i.e. according to Equation (26). In addition, the government imposes a
Pigouvian tax τ(z) on polluting consumption, which we allow to be spatially diﬀerenti-
ated. Denoting the household’s income with y(z) and the rent for living space with r(z),





1−α − d(E) subject to y(z) = (p + τ(z))x(z) + r(z)s(z).







By comparing this equation to (25), we ﬁnd that the condition for the household’s opti-
mum is equal to the condition for the Pareto optimum, if the rent r(z) for living space is
as given by Equation (24) and the tax rate τ(z) on consumption is
τ(z) = γ(i(z))D
0, (37)
where the social marginal damage from pollution D0 is given by Equation (23).
The tax rate τ(z), Equation (37), depends on the place where the respective unit is
consumed because it depends on the amount of infrastructure provided there. Diﬀeren-
tiating (37) with respect to space, using γ0(i(z)) < 0 (Condition 5) and Proposition 1,
yields the result that the optimal tax rate increases from the CID to the periphery, i.e.
τ0(z) > 0. In other words, the tax rate equals the marginal social damage of one unit
of consumption, which depends on the amount of infrastructure available at the place
where the unit of the goods is consumed. At places where infrastructure density is high,
marginal damage is comparatively low and vice versa. Hence, the tax rate is highest in the
city centre, where infrastructure density is highest, and declines towards the periphery,
where infrastructure is is provided at a lower level.
To implement the optimum as a spatial equilibrium, we also need to ensure that the
spatial equilibrium condition holds, i.e. that the indirect utility of the representative
individual everywhere is the same. The indirect utility function reads:
v
pub(z) = α
α (1 − α)
1−α y(z)(p + τ(z))
−α r(z)
−(1−α) − d(E). (38)




















Here, we have inserted the demand functions for goods and living space as well as Con-
dition (35). It can immediately be seen that with the same incomes as in the laissez-faire
equilibrium, given by (28), this equation does not hold: in contrast to the laissez-faire
equilibrium, the price of the consumption commodity is not independent of space, be-
cause τ0(z) > 0. Hence, a redistribution of incomes is necessary. Together with the results
derived above, this determines the optimal environmental policy in the case of publicly
supplied infrastructure.
Proposition 3 (Environmental policy with public provision of infrastructure)
Three policy instruments are needed to reach a ﬁrst best in a decentralised economy with
a public infrastructural provision:
1. a spatially diﬀerentiated supply of infrastructure according to (27),
2. a spatially diﬀerentiated tax on consumption with rate τ(z), where τ(z) increases
monotonically with the distance from the CID, dτ(z)/dz > 0 for 0 ≤ z ≤ Z,
3. a redistribution of incomes from individuals living near the city centre to individuals




0(z)x(z) > 0. (40)
Proof: Only Part 3. remains to be proven. It follows from comparing y0(z) = −wt0
c(z)+
Θ0(z) with the spatial equilibrium condition (39). 2
Hence, the optimal environmental policy requires three instruments, and all of them
have to be spatially diﬀerentiated: the density of infrastructure declines from the CID to
the periphery, the tax rate increases with the distance from the CID, and there is a redis-
tribution of incomes from the centre to the periphery. All these spatial diﬀerentiations
20– which are jointly endogenously determined – result from including pollution-reducing
infrastructure in the model. If the possibility of a spatially distributed supply of infra-
structure is neglected, i.e. if γ(i(z)) ≡ const, the tax rate τ is uniform all over the city
and a spatially diﬀerentiated redistribution of incomes would be unnecessary.
The supply of infrastructure i(z) and the redistribution Θ(z) of incomes are deter-
mined by the diﬀerential equations (27) and (40), respectively, together with the resource
constraints and the condition that the rent r(Z) for living space at the border of the city
equals the rural rent r, r(Z) = r. Given i(z) and Θ(z), the tax on consumption may be
calculated from (37).20
5.3 Private supply of infrastructure
In this section, we shall consider the setting in which infrastructure is provided by private
households. We will introduce two policy instruments of the urban government, a tax
θ(z) on polluting emissions and a subsidy σ(z) on the private supply of pollution-reducing
infrastructure. Both instruments are allowed to be spatially diﬀerentiated in the ﬁrst
place. In this setting, the household chooses the amount of polluting emissions e(z)
indirectly by choosing the infrastructure supply i(z). The optimisation problem of a





1−α − d(E) subject to (41)
y(z) = px(z) + r(z)s(z) + (pi + w − σ(z))i(z) + θ(z)e(z)
e(z) = γ(i(z))x(z)








0(i(z))x(z) = pi + w (43)
The comparison of condition (42) with (25) yields:
θ(z) = θ = pD
0, (44)
20However, it is not possible to derive a closed form solution in general.
21i.e. θ(z) equals the social marginal damage of one unit of pollution, which is constant
throughout the city. Hence, the Pigouvian tax θ(z) = θ is the same for all households.
Inserting Equation (44) into (43) and comparing this equation to the condition for the




(pi + w). (45)
The necessity of subsidising infrastructure results from the fact that infrastructure is a
public means of abating emissions, i.e. it serves not only one household, but all n(z)
households residing in [z,z +dz]. To ensure the optimal supply of this local public good,
a subsidy is required, as given by Equation (45).
The subsidy (45) varies at diﬀerent places in the city. As stated in Corollary 1, the
optimal population density declines from the city centre to the periphery. Thus, the
subsidy declines as well. As a consequence, in the case of privately supplied infrastruc-
ture, a similar redistribution of incomes is necessary as in the case of public supply of
infrastructure (cf. Proposition 3).
The three instruments of environmental policy in the case of private supply of infra-
structure are summarised in the following result.
Proposition 4 (Environmental policy with private supply of infrastructure)
Three policy instruments are needed to achieve a ﬁrst best in a decentralised economy
with a private provision of infrastructure:
1. a spatially diﬀerentiated subsidy on infrastructure (Equation 45),
2. a spatially homogenous tax on emissions (Equation 44), and









Proof: see Appendix A.4
6 Conclusions and discussion
Pollution-reducing infrastructure has been incorporated in the model as a public means
of pollution abatement. As modelled here, pollution-reducing infrastructure serves to
22dispose a part of the by-products from consumption of goods properly, i.e. such that only
the remainder contributes to the damaging emissions. Thereby, infrastructure is a public
means of pollution abatement, as one unit of infrastructure serves all households living
in the immediate neighbourhood.
Providing infrastructure in order to improve urban environmental quality is most im-
portant in the context of rapidly growing cities in developing countries. We have shown
that infrastructural provision has to be changed throughout the city if population in-
creases, not just in newly inhabited areas. In order to investigate this issue in more
detail, however, an extension to a dynamic model would be necessary, which would then
also be capable of describing infrastructure – more realistically – in terms of capital goods.
We assumed homogenous environmental pollution in the city, in particular, one unit
of emissions contributes to the same extent to environmental pollution, irrespective of
where it is emitted. Hence, the Pigouvian tax on emissions is the same all over the city.
However, how much emissions are generated by one unit of consumption depends on
the infrastructure at the place, where the respective unit is consumed. Vice versa, the
optimal supply of infrastructure at each place depends on the amount of consumption
and the population density there. Given the structure of the city with a CID in the centre
and commuting costs increasing with the distance from the CID, infrastructure density
should be highest in the CID and decline monotonically towards the periphery. Hence,
environmental policy by means of pollution-reducing infrastructure has to be spatially
diﬀerentiated. There are two possibilities of providing infrastructure.
First, the urban government can build infrastructure. In that case, the household’s
only opportunity of abating emissions is by reducing consumption. Hence, the tax on
emissions is eﬀectively a tax on consumption, which depends on the location at which
the respective unit is consumed. As a result, the tax burden diﬀers from one location
to another and a redistribution of incomes becomes necessary in order to implement the
optimum as a residential equilibrium.
Second, infrastructure may be provided by private households. In that case, households
may abate emissions by supplying pollution-reducing infrastructure, i.e. they can choose
emissions independently of consumption by choosing the infrastructure density. Since it
is a public means of abatement, private households undersupply infrastructure, unless a
23subsidy on infrastructure is paid.21 This subsidy has to be spatially diﬀerentiated and,
hence, a redistribution of incomes is necessary to implement the optimum as a residential
equilibrium.22
To summarise, if pollution-reducing infrastructure is recognised as a means of ur-
ban environmental policy, ﬁscal policy instruments have to be spatially diﬀerentiated,
too, and, moreover, adequate transfer payments are needed to implement the Pareto
optimum as residential market equilibrium. These sophisticated policies result from con-
sidering pollution-reducing infrastructure as a means of urban environmental policy and
jointly determining infrastructure supply and ﬁscal policy instruments. Given the obvi-
ous relevance of infrastructure for urban environmental quality, this approach may lead
to considerable welfare gains.
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26A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1














p + γ(i(z))D0 D
0 = pi + pF
0(L).























The right hand side of this equation is negative, because
r(z)
(24)














c(z) < 0. To prove the proposition, we ﬁnally show that
γ0(i(z))D0











































as γ0(i(z)) < 0 (the last conclusion) and γ00(i(z)) > 0 (the conclusion from the ﬁrst to
the second line). 2
27A.2 Proof of Corollary 1













r0(z)(p + γ(i(z))) − r(z)γ0(i(z))i0(z)
(p + γ(i(z)))2 < 0, (50)
as i0(z) < 0 (Proposition 1).








































Combining both equations leads to the result s0(z)/s(z) > 0 and x0(z)/x(z) < 0. Using
the condition n(z) = 1/s(z), we have the last result n0(z)/n(z) < 0. 2
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
Diﬀerentiate (47) with respect to N, considering the endogenous variables as functions
of N. This yields:

γ0(i(z))D0















































The expression in brackets on the left hand side is positive, as has been shown in the
previous section A.1. We will proceed by showing that the right hand side is positive,
too, provided tc(z) = tc · z, F(L) = f · L, d(E) = δ · E, r = 0 and pi = 0.





















If the population of the city increases, it is certainly not optimal to move any person
further outside. It is neither optimal to locate all the new inhabitants beyond the former
border of the city. As a consequence, the population density n(z) is non-decreasing in N
everywhere in the city. On the other hand, since it carries opportunity costs to increase
the population density, the city will expand, i.e. dZ/dN > 0. As a consequence, we have
dr(z)/dN > 0.



















Certainly, the total labor supply L increases, if N increases. It remains to be shown that
x(z)α s(z)1−α decreases, if N increases. We therefore show that the average consumption
of goods ¯ x and the average ﬂat size ¯ s decrease. As a consequence, average utility decreases
with increasing urban population N in the optimum.


















because r = 0 and pi = 0 by assumption. Since the average worker lives further away
from the city center, and therefore the average commuting time increases if N increases,
the average output per worker decreases. Thus, d¯ x/dN < 0.
The average size of living space is ¯ s = Z
N. We have shown above, that Z increases
with N, but since some of the new urban inhabitants move further to the city center, the
average lot size will decrease. Thus, d¯ s/dN < 0.
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Parts 1. and 2. of the proposition have been proven above. Here, we prove part 3. Given
the subsidy (45) on infrastructure, a household residing at z has a net income
y




29Inserting this, the indirect utility is
v
priv(z) = α











































0 x(z) + r
0(z)s(z) + (pi + w)
i0(z)
n(z)
































Here we have inserted Condition (26) for the optimal supply of infrastructure to derive
the second equality and used Equation (35) for the last conclusion. By Corollary 1, we
have n0(z)/n(z) < 0. The comparison of y0(z) = −wt0
c(z) + Θ0(z) with Condition (52)
proves
Θ
0(z) = −
pi + w
n(z)
i(z)
n0(z)
n(z)
> 0. (53)
2
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